SAME OLD CHALLENGES

The author is a team leader, Advocacy Component, ADB-DA Grains Sector Development Program and undersecretary for Policy and Planning, DA, 1988-1992

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo recently showed Leonardo Montemayor

the door and ushered in Cito Lorenzo as the new secretary of Agriculture.

So far, 12 men have served as secretary of Agriculture since 1971.

Since EDSA1 in 1986, the average period in service of Agriculture

secretaries has been a mere 21 months.

Department of Agriculture (DA) leadership, 1971 – 2002

From – To	Secretary of Agriculture	Months of Service
Jan. 1971 – June 1984	Arturo M. Tanco*	162
July 1984 – Feb. 1986	Salvador H. Escudero	20
March 1986 – Feb. 1987	Ramon V. Mitra	12
March 1987 – Dec. 1989	Carlos G. Dominguez	34
Jan. 1990 – June 1992	Senen C. Bacani	30
July 1992 – Feb. 1996	Roberto S. Sebastian	44
March 1996 – June 1998	Salvador H. Escudero	25
July 1998 – April 1999	William D. Dar**	9
May 1999 – Dec. 2000	Edgardo J. Angara	19
Jan. 6 – Feb. 15, 2001	Domingo F. Panganiban	1
Feb. 2001 – Nov. 2002	Leonardo Q. Montemayor	21
Dec. 1, 2002 – ?	Cito Lorenzo, Jr.	?

* Including Environment, Natural Resources and Agrarian Reform.

** Acting Secretary

We have yet to hear from Mr. Lorenzo, but bar none, each of the

previous secretaries of Agriculture said their priorities included

poverty alleviation and food security. Indeed, equity in access to land

resources for all, food security and rapid rural growth are important

goals for any administration. What makes the critical difference for

success is focus and implementation.

Success in the implementation of the strategy outlined below will

secure not only the completion of land transfer as mandated under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, adequate, cheaper food, more jobs,

increased incomes and reduced poverty, but also rapid and sustainable

advances in national growth.

Basic Problems and Constraints

The fundamental causes of food insecurity and poverty in the

Philippines have been intensively analyzed. The key factors are lack of

public investment and weak governance in the areas of irrigation, rural

infrastructure and agriculture and fisheries technology. The

antecedents of these ills include the:

• near cessation in new public investments in irrigation since the early 1980s;

• drastic drop in public investments in other rural infrastructure,

• inadequacy in public investments in technology development and

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) still has to be

completed. The program was to have come to a close in 1998, but poor

performance and the continuing concern for equity enabled the extension

of the life of the CARP into the new millennium. Furthermore,

inadequacies in support services endangered the limited gains achieved.

Reversing the downward trajectory of agriculture sector productivity

and completing agrarian transfer has been made much more difficult by

weakness in the governance of the agriculture and fisheries bureaucracy

due to discontinuous, fragmented authority and responsibility and the

unresolved effects of devolution. Weak governance has also allowed

substantial waste – exemplified in:

• non-targeted subsidies provided through the National Food Authority;

• sluggishness in implementation at the National Irrigation Authority; and

• divided leadership and roles in rural development and agrarian

These infirmities were at their worst during the first half of the

1980s. Between 1986 and the present, the administrations of both

presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos were in most cases able to

only “hold the line” on these problems. At their best, presidents

Aquino and Ramos achieved some advances but their efforts still fell

short when compared with our ASEAN neighbors. Since President Estrada’s

watch, the state of agriculture has turned from bad to worse. There has

been back tracking in recent years, particularly in agricultural trade

policy – involving especially rice, sugar and coconut.

The government, particularly the DA and the DAR, must focus, focus,

focus on the fundamental problems and finally defeat these – once and

for all – to succeed in attaining food security and alleviating

poverty. The problems of inadequate public investment in, and weak

governance of, the agriculture and fisheries sectors are paramount and

should be attended to first and foremost.

Certainly there are many other concerns in the agricultural and

fisheries sector. However, most of these other problems are symptomatic

of, or are rooted in, the fundamental inadequacies in public investment

and governance. Therefore the government, the President and the DA must

not be distracted from attending to the fundamental issues, since the

resolution of these root causes will greatly reduce the effort required

to deal with the other and more peripheral concerns.

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There are many other concerns in the agriculture and fisheries sector.

However, most of these other problems are rooted in the fundamental

inadequacies in public investment and governance. Therefore, the

government must not be distracted from attending to the fundamental

issues since the resolution of these root causes will greatly reduce

the effort required to deal with the other and more peripheral concerns.

The specific thrusts that must be executed to rapidly attain the overall goals of food security and poverty alleviation are:

• Strong and Unified Leadership of the Department of Agrarian

Unification can be achieved by simply appointing a

single secretary to lead both the DA and the DAR, and having the DAR

focus purely on land transfer functions and the DA on support services

for all farmers, whether agrarian reform beneficiaries or not.

• Irrigation – Major expansion and acceleration of the construction

Measures include refocusing the NIA from construction to

technical assistance, liberalized trade in pumps, shallow tube wells

and other irrigation equipment. The government’s role will be limited

to aquifer identification, engineering specifications and contract

oversight. In the short run, the construction and commerce arising from

irrigation programs will push rural employment. In the long run,

irrigation will ensure plentiful, cheaper food and higher wages for all.

• Rural Roads, Ports and Transport – Major expansion and

• Technology Budgets, Clear Accountability for Research and

• Partnership with LGUs to Revitalize Local Agriculture –

• Immediate Reductions in Food Prices and Targeted Food Subsidies

We should take advantage of the currently very low world prices of

rice. The NFA can bid out import contracts to many more private traders

and also earn much-needed revenue. Also, the distribution of the cheap

imported rice should be targeted at the poor through joint effort of

NFA, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and LGUs. Thus

simultaneously achieved is the reduction of budget support for NFA,

improved revenues, targeted support for the poor and partnership

between NFA, DA and DSWD.

In all of these initiatives, the unified DA and DAR must lead and be

supported by the rest of government, including Congress. The Government

must set directions and devolve authority, responsibility and funds to

its partners and implementors – the LGUs, NGOs, POs, universities and

technology institutions.

The President and the unified leadership of DA and DAR must not waste

this opportunity. Strong, determined leadership is critical. The

leadership must focus, focus, focus like a laser on the basic issues

from day one, and not waver until the task is done.